1. Introduction. In Laws and Symmetry, van Fraassen comments that philosophers of science have focused on the product of science, the theory, to the exclusion of the "aim, conditions, and processes of production" (1989, 189) . This paper aims to fill this lacuna, especially with regard to evolutionary biology. In particular, I take a closer look at the use of models in the practice of evolutionary biology. The product/process analogy assimilates science to industry, implying that the aim of science is the production of theories, and that a strict demarcation can be made between the product, theories, and the process, scientific practice. One of the aims of this paper is to challenge this strict demarcation. I argue that the diverse types and functions of models and modeling in biology are not easily categorized as either product or process. A further aim is to consider the consequences of blurring the line of demarcation between theory and practice for the semantic approach to scientific theories.
The classic semantic view of van Fraassen (1980 van Fraassen ( , 1989 char theories as families of models. A theory is empirically adequa empirical substructures of one's "theory model" are isomorphic or turally identical to one's "data model." So, confirmation is esse between model and data. As I will demonstrate below, confirm identity of structure between theory and data model is inadequate scribe the ways in which many models are deployed in evoluti ology. This paper thus follows the route of Downes (1992) and (1990, 1991) , who have each advocated a more "liberal" or "ex semantic view of theories. They question whether isomorphism is way to conceive of the relation between theory and world, an the metamathematical sense of model adopted by the semantic serve as a template for all models in science. Beatty (1981) , Lloyd (1988) , and Thompson (1985 Thompson ( , 1989 h appropriated the semantic view as a way to describe the structure lutionary theory. They argue that it resolves many of the problem arise for evolutionary theory on the received, or "syntactic" instance, they claim that the criticism that evolutionary theor scientific theory because of its alleged lack of laws is rendered the semantic view. However, Ereshefsky (1991) and Sloep and Steen (1987) have argued that the semantic view faces some of difficulties as the received view. Ereshefsky argues that the sema proach cannot dispense with laws. Moreover, he points out t evolutionary explanations often employ information from a n subdisciplines within evolutionary biology, giving a formal ac their structure is forbiddingly complex, whether one adopts the s or the syntactic approach. In other words, the complex relatio theory and world is no less complex once one substitutes models a beddability requirements for axioms and partial interpretation ru Ereshefsky, I am skeptical that a formal account of theory an mation can be true to the practice of biology.
In formal approaches to characterizing the structure and confir of theories, such as the semantic approach, the theory-world relat hierarchy, with theories as fixed entities, directing practice in a t fashion. Nancy Cartwright (1999) calls this the "vending mach of theories. By contrast, she suggests that the practice of model b is a creative act, and often independent of specific dictates of the wise, Morgan and Morrison (1999) have argued that models in may be autonomous agents and instruments of investigation. take them to mean that in the process of constructing and ma models, we can explore questions and discover novel empirical phe that are not derivable from or predicted by our best theories. I th the views I've sketched here of Cartwright and Morgan and Morri S226 not incompatible with a more "liberal" semantic view of the so cated by Downes and Griesemer. This paper will thus go some way towards attempting to recon insights of these critics and advocates of the semantic view. Evolut biologists are often attempting to answer historical questions. So, t and deciding these questions often hinges on plausibility argum existence proofs. Mathematical and material models are deploye guments that some process or mechanism could be at work in Brandon (1990) has summed up this issue by describing the sort of nations often offered in evolutionary biology as "how possibly nations. "How actually" explanations are comparatively rare. He that biologists are often forced to settle for plausible scenarios, as to exhaustive explanations, given the historical character of bi well as the complexity of ecological and biological systems. This close to the one I wish to make about models providing plausib guments. Often in evolutionary biology, it is more appropriate of consilience of induction by appeal to several model-argument than confirmation via fit or isomorphism between models and w what follows, I will first discuss how I think that the picture o mation offered by advocates of the semantic view might be el upon to better reflect scientific practice, and second, how three di examples of modeling in biology serve as instruments of inquiry, e proof, and model-argument, respectively.
2. On the Semantic Picture of Confirmation. E. Lloyd (1988) discuss forms of confirmation: fit between some model and data, inde testing of some aspect of a model, and variety of evidence. Each of types of confirmation, she argues, is a variant of the same general demonstration that a natural system is isomorphic in certain respe model. While I think that Lloyd's account is the best we have yet o evolutionary hypotheses are confirmed, I wish to suggest the f emendations of her view.
Isomorphism, while it may be an ideal relation between model and world, is often neither hoped for nor possible, in evolutionary biology.
Lloyd mentions this point in a footnote (1988, 168) , but I think that this issue calls for greater elaboration. Many models are simulations of natural systems. While one hopes to incorporate as much realism as possible in such cases, laboratory or computer simulations will necessarily be very different from natural systems. In fact, it is exactly when a process in nature is too complicated to track, or would take too long to observe, that such simulations are appropriate. Biologists do not expect such simulations to be isomorphic to natural systems. Rather, simulation models serve in both an exploratory and argumentative role. A simulation can yield All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms new empirical results, or suggest that one or another factor in th tionary process is more or less significant. I will discuss an elegan below of a simulation of 20,000 generations of evolution using an experimental system. Modeling in biology often has the role of demonstrating the pla of some process or mechanism. While Lloyd mentions this po discussion of Beckner, I believe that this important function of m in biology gets left to one side in her subsequent discussion. So the question is not whether one can generate a model whose as are well confirmed or whose results have a good fit with empi but whether one can generate a model at all that is just robust en
give us good reason to expect that some process could occur in
Success at constructing such a model can serve as an existence pro and Salt's (1988) model of speciation in sympatry is one exam below). Lloyd devotes some discussion to the problem of counterfactual assumptions or idealizations-we are warned to be skeptical of models that employ such assumptions. I agree. However, I would argue that there are some cases where this skepticism ought to be suspended. There are an enormous number of factors at work in any evolutionary process. To incorporate all these factors in a model would quickly make our mathematics intractable. Counterfactual assumptions are thus par for the course in modeling evolutionary dynamics. Infinite population size, haploidy, or random mating, are often unavoidable, if counterfactual, assumptions one needs to make in order to answer specific evolutionary questions. Proponents of the semantic view argue that models are abstract and often involve idealization. Theoretical hypotheses serve as an empirical interpretation of theoretical models, namely, that the model is isomorphic in some respect to the world. However, this brief story sidesteps one of the most interesting aspects of the interpretation and evaluation of models and modeling: which kind of idealizations are appropriate in which contexts and why. While I cannot hope to provide an exhaustive answer to this question here, I'll suggest the following. The question of independent support for one or another assumption is sensitive to the kind of questions one is addressing. Moreover, there is a fundamental trade-off at work in deciding upon model assumptions: how much are you willing to sacrifice in explanatory detail in exchange for a general and tractable answer to some evolutionary question? The amount of risk one takes in ignoring complicating factors is directly proportional to the gain in degree of generality of one's model. In some cases, assuming an infinite population size or random mating is appropriate; it depends both on the context and the risk one is willing to assume. 3. Some Models of Models. Now I will consider three examples of mo which illustrate the instrumental and argumentative role of diverse of models in biology. J. Griesemer (1990) generations, Lenski and his students are discovering new in about the dynamics of evolutionary change. In particular, sev strains acquired a mutation, which caused them to have an ele tation rate. These strains can be put into competition with other manipulated using molecular techniques, to address questions evolution of mutation rates: Is there an upper or lower limit on mutation? What constrains that limit? In other words, Lenski's m fruitful source of new questions and potential experiments.
Lenski has used his system to argue that the divergence in relative strains (see Figure 1) , all resulting from a common ancestor, sugg drift plays a significant role in the evolutionary process.
Another such material model is the 'speciation machine' con by Rice and Salt (1988; see Figure 2 ). Rice and Salt construct ratory model similar to Lenski's which they claim demonstrates tiveness of speciation in sympatry, i.e., within an interbreeding This is only one among many experiments with laboratory populations of Drosophila that have been used to investigate different hypotheses about speciation. There has been at least forty years of work on speciation in the lab. Drosophila are the organism of choice, and there have been tests of selective divergence, founder effect, and sympatry (for a review, see Rice and Hostert 1993). Rice and Salt's work challenges what has been the received view among evolutionary biologists, namely that geographical or spatial isolation is a crucial condition for speciation, and that directional selection alone cannot generate new species. The mainstream view for approximately fifty years among evolutionary biologists is that speciation in allopatry (geographical isolation) is the major mode of speciation, and that founder effect (the isolation of a small subpopulation and reconstitution of the genetic architecture through drift) is one of the most common means of speciation. Rice and Salt's model serves as an argument to the contrary. Their laboratory model thus serves as an existence proof that speciation can occur in sympatry. Several questions arise out of this material modeling of the s process. For example, how relevant are laboratory experiments ation in the wild? Some might question the relevance of Rice experiment to natural speciation processes. Others claim that l populations are fundamentally different from natural popula therefore laboratory experiments and breeding experiments are ir to the problem of how new species arise. This argument is in the of naturalists such as Jordon and Kellogg (1907) , who claime product of the botanical garden as a result of breeding experimen count as a case of speciation.
Additionally, how are we to evaluate the results of these sp experiments? How isolated is 'reproductively isolated'? Must Rather, one or several parameters-e.g., selection by habitat etc.-can be tested either individually or in combination or with one another. Models such as Rice and Salt's are not decisive tests so much as supplementary lines of evidence. The standard top-down picture of theoretical models being confirmed by laboratory or fieldwork is not appropriate here. The theory of sympatry is not confirmed by identifying isomorphisms between the laboratory data and the theory model. Rather, the very fact that Rice and Salt were successful at constructing simulation of speciation in sympatry serves as an argument for its occurring in nature.
In evolutionary biology, often simply demonstrating the possibility of some process in the lab is a persuasive case for its occurrence in nature.
In this case, lowered viability in crosses of these lab strains is an argument for the possibility of sympatry in the wild. Multiple lines of evidence from multiple different subdisciplines within evolutionary biology bear on the question of how important, for instance, drift is in evolution, or which mode of speciation is possible or prevalent in nature. Evolutionary questions are almost never decided by single "crucial experiments." Biologists construct models such as Lenski's and Rice and Salt's not to prove the relative significance of one or another factor in the evolutionary process, but to provide a plausibility argument. In this sense, a laboratory experiment functions in the same way as some theoretical or mathematical models in population genetics. Mathematical models can serve as arguments as well. Moreover, mathematical models can answer questions that laboratory models cannot.
For example, another line of evidence on the role of founder effect in speciation is theoretical population genetic models. Two self-professed neo-Darwinians, Barton and Charlesworth (1984) , devoted a review paper to theoretical objections to the founder model. They concluded that although founder effects may cause speciation, they are only a very rare extreme along a continuous range of possibilities. Complete geographic isolation is unnecessary, and selection can break up coadapted systems of alleles. In particular, they question the "genetic revolution" as a mechanism of speciation, and argue that speciation is more likely the result of small steps than a single founder event.
While the theoretical arguments are too mathematically complex to reproduce here, Barton and Charlesworth show how under both singleand multi-locus models, reduction in variability induced by drift reduces the chances of peak shifts, i.e., the transition from one equilibrium under All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms selection to another. Selection requires variability to act upo heterozygosity during a founder event reduces that variabil (1942, 1963, 1970) argued that reduction in population size w speciation, in that such a reduction would entail an exposure of ne combinations because of a loss of heterozygosity. The resulting tr mation of the genetic composition of a population has been cal netic revolution." Barton and Charlesworth counter that the loss of heterozygosity can occur only in populations that grow so slowly that they are more likely to die out than evolve into new species. They also explain that the probability of peak shifts-moving from one peak on Wright's adaptive landscape to another-decreases exponentially with the size of each step. In other words, the probability that a founder population will undergo a rapid transition to a new selective equilibrium is very low. Reproductive isolation is more likely to evolve in a series of small steps than in a single "genetic revolution." Their mathematical model serves as an argument against the founder effect, or more specifically, "genetic revolutions" playing a role in speciation.
One might argue that the classic semantic view is still appropriate for these examples. For instance, the habitat maze is a structure that is true for, or satisfies, the sentences of the theory of sympatry. However, the usefulness of this metamathematical sense of model is stretched to the limit when it comes to describing how such models function in the practice of evolutionary biology. Models such as Rice and Salt's habitat maze, or Barton and Charlesworth's mathematical model of peak shifts, are not confirmations, nor are they theoretical models that await confirmation. The laboratory model is a caricature of what actually goes on in natural populations. Laboratory models such as Rice and Salt's function simultaneously as a tool for investigation and a test of the plausibility of one mechanism of speciation. If sympatry were possible, how would it work?
And, can we make it work? Barton and Charlesworth's model functions as an argument, not a theory that awaits testing in the lab or field. Multiple different types of models which jointly establish the plausibility of the same mechanism yield a consilience of induction in favor of its existence in nature. Confirmation in historical disciplines such as evolutionary biology is rarely a matter of simply checking the fit between model and world. Because we can rarely see evolution in action, evolutionary biologists use models as tools for investigation, existence proofs, and arguments for or against the plausibility of one or another mechanism at work in nature.
4. Conclusion. Biologists more often than not resort to laboratory simulations and idealized mathematical models as sources of plausibility arguments. Moreover, models and modeling can have multiple, diverse func-S234 tions, which are not easily characterized as either theory making or confirmation. Models can yield new questions or empirical phenomena not predicted by theory, serve as existence proofs, or as arguments for or against the significance of one or another mechanism at work in nature.
While the appropriation of formal semantics was a helpful way to get out of the rut of viewing theories as sets of axioms, the semantic view still carries the taint of the discovery-justification divide. In evolutionary biology, discovery and justification, along with theory and practice, are not so easily demarcated. Models and modeling are not ancillary to theory, but can function as independent tools for investigation.
